

ENERGY GEOPOLITICS OF THE REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN REGION (2016–2026)

Dilshod Olimov

Director of the Center for Energy Diplomacy and Geopolitics, Institute for Advanced
International Studies, University of World Economy and Diplomacy (UWED),
Tashkent, Uzbekistan

Abstract: The article examines the transformation of the energy policy of the Republic of Uzbekistan and its geopolitical dimension in the Central Asian region over the period 2016–2026. It analyses the institutional reforms of the fuel and energy sector, the change in the country's position on the regional gas market – the shift from net exporter to a stable importer of pipeline gas from the Russian Federation, the development of nuclear power in partnership with the state corporation Rosatom, the accelerated expansion of renewable energy capacity and the emergence of trans-regional “green” energy corridors, as well as water-energy issues in relations with the Republic of Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic. Drawing on official documents, statistical data from international organisations and materials from specialised media, the article demonstrates that Uzbekistan's energy policy in the period under review has acquired a pronounced geopolitical dimension and has evolved from an instrument for ensuring domestic energy security into an instrument of regional diplomacy and of positioning the country as a connecting energy hub of Central Asia. Conclusions are drawn regarding the multi-vector character of Tashkent's energy strategy, and directions for further research are outlined.

Keywords: energy geopolitics, Uzbekistan, Central Asia, energy security, gas diplomacy, nuclear power, renewable energy sources, water-energy complex.

1. Introduction

The energy factor traditionally occupies a central place in the system of international relations in Central Asia, owing to the uneven distribution of hydrocarbon and hydropower resources among the states of the region, the infrastructural interdependence inherited from the Soviet period, and the growing demand for electricity amid demographic growth. The Republic of Uzbekistan, which has the most diversified economy and the largest population in the region, occupies a special place within this system: possessing substantial natural gas reserves while simultaneously experiencing a shortage of generating capacity over the past decade, the country has been compelled to pursue a multi-vector energy policy that combines traditional cooperation with the Russian Federation, partnership with Asian and European development institutions, and its own programme of energy-mix diversification.

The chronological scope of the study – 2016–2026 – is defined by the beginning of systemic reforms of Uzbekistan's fuel and energy complex, initiated after the change of the country's political leadership in 2016, and concludes with the current period, characterised by the practical implementation of major infrastructure projects – the construction of a nuclear power plant with Rosatom's participation, the expansion of Russian gas supplies, and the formation of cross-border “green” energy corridors involving Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.

The relevance of the topic stems from the fact that Uzbekistan's energy policy during this period has moved beyond the tasks of domestic energy supply and acquired a distinct regional and geopolitical dimension, influencing the balance of interests of external actors – Russia, China, the European Union and international financial institutions – in Central Asia.

The object of the study is the system of energy relations in the Central Asian region in 2016–2026. The subject of the study is the energy policy of the Republic of Uzbekistan as a factor of regional geopolitics.

The aim of the article is to identify the main directions and geopolitical content of Uzbekistan's energy policy in Central Asia during the period 2016–2026. To achieve this aim, the

following tasks were set: 1) to characterise the institutional reforms of Uzbekistan's energy sector after 2016; 2) to analyse the dynamics of Uzbekistan's gas relations with the Russian Federation and other suppliers; 3) to examine the development of nuclear power as an element of energy diplomacy; 4) to assess the scale and regional significance of the renewable energy development programme; 5) to characterise the water-energy issues in Uzbekistan's relations with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan; 6) to determine Uzbekistan's place within the system of the region's multi-vector energy ties involving external actors.

2. Literature Review

The theoretical basis for studying energy geopolitics is formed by scholarship on energy diplomacy as an instrument of state foreign policy. The concept of energy diplomacy as a set of practical aspects of a state's interaction with the leading actors of world energy policy at the global, regional and national levels was developed in the works of S. Z. Zhiznin [1]. A structural-functional approach to analysing the processes and institutions of energy diplomacy, applicable to a wide range of regional configurations, has been developed in research devoted to the comparative study of energy dialogues in different regions of the world [2]. The relationship between national energy security, energy diplomacy and geopolitics with regard to resource-rich post-Soviet states, including the countries of the Caspian region and Central Asia, is examined in studies analysing the regional priorities of Russian energy policy [3].

A separate strand of research addresses the water-energy problems of Central Asia, viewed as a source of structural contradictions between the “upstream” states (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan) and the “downstream” states (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan) of the region's principal rivers. Studies on this subject note that contradictions in the water-energy sphere date back to the 1930s and are likely to intensify in the long term owing to population growth and climate change [4]. It has also been shown that neither Kyrgyzstan nor Tajikistan possesses independent financial or technical capacity to implement such large hydropower projects as the Kambar-Ata cascade and the Rogun hydroelectric power plant, which makes these projects dependent on attracting external investors and, at the same time, a subject of interstate disputes [5]. The position of the Russian Federation with regard to the region's water-energy contradictions, including the need to find multilateral forms of cooperation between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, is analysed in a separate study [6]. International financial institutions, in particular the World Bank Group, regard the water-energy complex of Central Asia as a unified system, in which the hydropower potential of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan is significant for the decarbonisation of the region's energy sector, while water resources remain critically important for cooling thermal power plants in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan [7]. A comprehensive review of the problems and prospects of energy development in Central Asia, including questions of restoring a unified integrated regional power system, is presented in analytical materials of the Russian International Affairs Council [8].

A further body of sources comprises documentary and news materials from specialised outlets (Gazeta.uz, Kun.uz, Spot.uz, Vedomosti, Forbes, TASS, Interfax, and publications of the state corporation Rosatom) reflecting the progress of specific projects – the construction of the nuclear power plant, the expansion of Russian gas supplies, and the implementation of renewable energy programmes. Despite the substantial volume of empirical material, existing scholarship does not yet offer a comprehensive analysis of Uzbekistan's energy policy in 2016–2026 as an integrated system combining the gas, nuclear, “green” and water-energy dimensions within a single geopolitical logic, which defines the research task of this article.

3. Methodology

The study is based on a qualitative case-study analysis of the energy policy of the Republic of Uzbekistan within the chronological framework of 2016–2026. A comparative-historical method was employed to identify the main stages in the transformation of the country's energy policy and to compare the target indicators declared at different stages of reform with the results actually achieved. Content analysis was applied to official statements of Uzbekistan's state authorities, materials from relevant agencies (the Ministry of Energy, the Uzatom Agency for Nuclear Energy Development), and publications of specialised media and news agencies for 2023–2026.

The empirical basis of the study comprised: 1) statistical and analytical materials from international organisations – the International Energy Agency, the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), and the World Bank Group; 2) reports from specialised news agencies and outlets on the progress of specific energy projects in 2023–2026; 3) scholarly publications on energy diplomacy and water-energy relations in Central Asia. The periodisation of the study includes three conditional stages: institutional reform (2016–2019), diversification and the launch of major infrastructure projects (2020–2023), and the practical implementation of a multi-vector energy strategy (2024–2026). A limitation of the study is its predominant reliance on open sources and media materials for the most recent period (2024–2026), since peer-reviewed scholarly publications devoted to this stage remain limited at the time of writing owing to its recency.

4. Results

4.1. Institutional Transformation of the Energy Sector after 2016

After 2016, Uzbekistan's energy sector became the object of consistent structural reforms aimed at transitioning from a vertically integrated model to a more open and investment-attractive management system. The country's energy development strategy through 2035 envisages the creation of a wholesale electricity market, the transfer of part of the grid infrastructure to private operators, and the introduction of RAB tariffs (tariffs based on a regulated asset base), which is intended to ensure an inflow of investment into grid modernisation [9]. According to estimates presented by representatives of the consulting company Boston Consulting Group, meeting growing demand will require Uzbekistan to generate 1.7 times more electricity by 2035 compared with the current level of consumption, necessitating investment of approximately USD 4 billion in the national power grids [10].

Notably, according to statements by representatives of the Uzbekistani government, the country's energy transformation is already extending beyond the national agenda and acquiring regional significance [9]. This formulation reflects a key trend of the period under review: Uzbekistan's energy policy is ceasing to be solely an instrument for ensuring domestic energy security and is becoming an element in positioning the country as a regional energy hub of Central Asia.

4.2. The Gas Factor: From Net Exporter to Stable Importer

The most illustrative demonstration of the transformation of Uzbekistan's energy geopolitics is the change in its position on the regional gas market. With domestic natural gas production of approximately 52 bcm per year as of 2023, Uzbekistan had traditionally been not only a producer but also an exporter of gas, including to the People's Republic of China via the Central Asia–China pipeline [11]. However, declining output at mature fields combined with rising domestic consumption drove the country's shift toward systematic purchases of pipeline gas from the Russian Federation.

Supplies of Russian gas to Uzbekistan via the “Central Asia – Center” trunk pipeline system through Kazakhstan began in October 2023, under a contract signed between Gazprom and the government of Uzbekistan in June 2023, with an initial volume of approximately 9 million m³ per day (around 2.8 bcm per year) [11]. In February 2024, the government of Uzbekistan approved a programme to increase Russian gas imports from 9 to 32 million m³ per day (approximately 11.68 bcm per year) as part of the modernisation of the trunk gas transport system in 2024–2030, at a cost of USD 500 million [12; 13]. At the same time, it was reported that in March 2024 Uzbekistan halved its gas exports to China, confirming the reorientation of the country's gas balance from an export-oriented to an import-substituting direction [13].

In 2024, Gazprom concluded an agreement with Kazakhstan on the transit of Russian gas toward Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan for the period 2025–2040, laying a long-term infrastructural foundation for expanding supplies [14]. According to the International Energy Agency, the actual volume of pipeline supplies from Russia to Uzbekistan amounted to approximately 7 bcm in 2025 and may exceed 10 bcm in 2026 [14]. Gazprom's own data indicate a 15% increase in exports to Uzbekistan in 2025, reaching 6.5 bcm [14]. According to estimates by the pricing agency Argus, the

cost of the supplied gas, including transit through Kazakhstan, was approximately USD 138 per 1,000 m³ [12]. The main indicators of the dynamics of gas supplies are summarised in Table 1.

Year	Volume of Russian gas imports, bcm/year	Main supply route
2023	≈1.28	“Central Asia – Center” system, transit via Kazakhstan
2024	up to 3.8 (planned)	“Central Asia – Center” system
2025	≈7.0	“Central Asia – Center” system
2026 (forecast)	more than 10.0	“Central Asia – Center” system

Table 1. Dynamics of pipeline gas supplies from the Russian Federation to the Republic of Uzbekistan, 2023–2026. Compiled by the author from data [11; 12; 13; 14].

The official position of the Uzbekistani side is that the expansion of gas cooperation with Russia is technical rather than of an allied nature: according to a statement by the head of Uzbekistan's Ministry of Energy, the conclusion of the gas agreement with Russia “does not signify an alliance” [11]. Nevertheless, the growing dependence on Russian gas supplies objectively increases the significance of the energy factor in bilateral relations and influences the balance of power in the region as a whole, given the parallel development of Russia's gas cooperation with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

4.3. Nuclear Power as an Instrument of Energy Diplomacy

The project to construct a nuclear power plant in Uzbekistan, discussed since 2017–2018, received practical development following the signing, in May 2024, during a state visit by the President of the Russian Federation to Uzbekistan, of a contract for the construction of the country's first small-capacity nuclear power plant (SNPP) in Jizzakh region, consisting of six reactors of 55 MW each; the general contractor was Atomstroyexport JSC (the engineering division of the state corporation Rosatom) [15; 16]. In 2025, the presidents of Uzbekistan and Russia agreed to reformat the project, envisaging the construction, on a single site near Lake Tuzkan, of a two-unit large-capacity nuclear power plant (with VVER-generation reactors) and a two-unit small-capacity plant with RITM-200N reactors [17; 18].

During 2025, the project moved into the phase of practical implementation: in May 2025, Rosatom's machine-building division began manufacturing reactor equipment for the SNPP, casting a 205-tonne alloy steel ingot for the RITM-200N reactor vessel; in September 2025, documents expanding cooperation between Rosatom and Uzatom were signed at the “World Atomic Week” event in Moscow; in October 2025, excavation works began for the small-capacity power unit's foundation pit [19; 20]. In March 2026, the parties signed a “roadmap” for the nuclear power plant project and an addendum to the contract [16]. According to Rosatom's estimates, implementation of the project could generate orders for Russian enterprises worth up to USD 24.7 billion, while the cost of the small-capacity plant itself, according to the latest estimates by Uzatom's management, is not expected to exceed USD 1–2 billion [16; 21].

The nuclear project exemplifies the use of energy infrastructure as an instrument of bilateral diplomacy: for Russia, participation in constructing the nuclear power plant in Uzbekistan consolidates its technological presence in Central Asia and provides a long-term economic effect for the national nuclear industry, while for Uzbekistan the project is regarded as a means of diversifying the energy mix, reducing dependence on gas-fired generation, and driving the country's technological modernisation [15; 21].

4.4. Renewable Energy and the Formation of Regional “Green” Corridors

Alongside the development of nuclear and gas-fired generation, Uzbekistan is implementing a large-scale programme to expand renewable energy capacity. In 2024, the country's authorities announced a target of bringing total installed RES capacity to 20 GW by 2030; the renewable energy share in the energy mix, initially planned at 40%, was revised upward in December 2024 to 54% [22]. As part of the distributed generation development programme, approximately 250,000

facilities, including 150,000 households, were planned to be equipped with solar panels in 2025 [10].

A significant geopolitical event was the signing in Baku in November 2024, within the framework of the 29th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP29), of a trilateral strategic partnership agreement between Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan on “green” energy transmission [23]. The agreement envisages laying a cable along the beds of the Caspian and Black Seas to connect the power systems of Central Asia, the South Caucasus and Europe, enabling the export of clean electricity produced in the region to European markets [22; 23]. Uzbekistan has stated its intention to establish electricity exports to Europe by 2030 [22]. At the same time, Uzbekistan is expanding cooperation with the Asian Development Bank in the areas of critical minerals, development of the “Middle Corridor” and “green” energy, as well as with the European Union under an Enhanced Partnership Agreement, which strengthens the country's role as a platform for regional dialogue [24; 9]. The key target indicators of Uzbekistan's energy-mix diversification programme are summarised in Table 2.

Indicator	Target value / status
Installed RES capacity by 2030	20 GW
Share of “green” energy in the energy mix by 2030	54% (revised upward from 40%)
Small-capacity NPP in Jizzakh region (SMR, RITM-200N)	Ground works began – October 2025
Large-capacity NPP (VVER-1000/1200)	Contract preparation; site – Lake Tuzkan, Jizzakh region
Growth in energy consumption by 2035	1.7-fold increase over the current level
Investment in national power grids	≈USD 4 billion

*Table 2. Target indicators for the development of renewable and nuclear energy in the Republic of Uzbekistan.
Compiled by the author from data [9; 10; 17; 18; 22].*

The formation of the cross-border “green” energy corridor Central Asia – South Caucasus – Europe demonstrates Uzbekistan's aspiration to diversify not only the structure of electricity generation but also the geography of its sales, thereby reducing the country's exclusive orientation toward the post-Soviet space and strengthening ties with the European direction.

4.5. Water-Energy Issues in Relations with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan

Beyond the gas, nuclear and “green” dimensions, an essential element of Uzbekistan's energy geopolitics remains the water-energy issue linked to the cross-border use of water resources in the Amu Darya and Syr Darya river basins. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, located in the upper reaches of these rivers, possess substantial hydropower potential, the realisation of which – in particular, the construction of the Rogun hydroelectric power plant in Tajikistan and the Kambar-Ata cascade in Kyrgyzstan – raises concern among downstream states, primarily Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, owing to the possible impact on the volume and seasonality of water use for irrigation purposes [4; 5].

Throughout the period under review, Uzbekistan advocated for an independent international expert assessment of the Rogun hydroelectric power plant project under the auspices of the United Nations, while the Tajikistani side declared its readiness to fulfil its obligations regarding water release regimes and indicated that the reservoir filling process would take approximately 14 years and would not significantly affect the water supply of neighbouring states [4]. Scholarly literature notes that these contradictions have a long history dating back to the 1930s and may intensify in the future under the influence of population growth and climate change [4], and also that neither Tajikistan nor Kyrgyzstan possesses independent financial or technical capacity to complete major hydropower projects, making them dependent on attracting external investors amid political and economic risks [5].

International financial institutions regard the region's water-energy complex as an interconnected system: the hydropower potential of upstream states is significant for the

decarbonisation of the region's energy sector as a whole, while water resources remain critically necessary for cooling thermal power plants in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which creates an objective interest for all countries of the region in developing coordinated mechanisms for managing the water-energy balance [7]. Analytical materials also note that resolving the region's electricity problems is scarcely possible without large-scale investment and the strengthening of ties among the major players of the regional energy market, and that Uzbekistan's withdrawal from the unified Central Asian energy ring was at the time linked to an aspiration to shift toward contractual currency and financial relations among the countries of the region [8].

4.6. Multi-Vector Energy Policy and External Actors

Taken together, the directions examined above – gas cooperation with Russia, nuclear partnership with Rosatom, the joint development of renewable energy with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, engagement with the Asian Development Bank and the European Union, and participation in resolving water-energy contradictions with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan – demonstrate the pronounced multi-vector character of Uzbekistan's energy strategy in 2016–2026. This strategy allows the country to simultaneously preserve traditional ties with the Russian Federation in the gas and nuclear spheres, develop new areas of cooperation with development institutions and the European Union in renewable energy, and position itself as a platform for regional dialogue on energy issues [24; 9].

5. Discussion

The findings make it possible to characterise Uzbekistan's energy policy in 2016–2026 as a consistent transition from a model of ensuring domestic energy security to a model of active regional positioning. Unlike approaches presented in earlier literature on Central Asian energy, in which Uzbekistan was predominantly viewed as one of several actors competing for resources and transit routes within a closed regional system [8], the results of the present study show that, by the mid-2020s, the country has been building its own multi-vector strategy, integrating both traditional (gas, nuclear) and new (“green”) areas of cooperation with a broad range of external partners.

At the same time, a structural contradiction persists between Uzbekistan's growing dependence on imported energy carriers – primarily pipeline gas from Russia – and its declared course toward diversifying the energy mix through nuclear and renewable generation. In the short term, the expansion of gas imports ensures the stability of energy supply; however, in the longer term it increases the country's dependence on a single external supplier, a trend partly offset by the development of nuclear power and RES as well as by the diversification of electricity export directions toward the European market via the emerging Trans-Caspian “green” corridor.

Water-energy issues remain the least regulated dimension of regional energy geopolitics: despite the absence of open conflicts between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan during the period under review, structural contradictions linked to the distribution of water resources and the implementation of major hydropower projects retain the potential to intensify as population growth and energy consumption increase across all countries of the region [4; 7]. In this context, proposals to restore elements of a unified regional power system in Central Asia and to develop multilateral cooperation in the water-energy sphere appear to be a promising, though not yet fully realised, direction of regional energy policy [6; 8].

A limitation of the present study is its predominant reliance on materials from official sources and specialised outlets for 2023–2026, given the relatively limited body of peer-reviewed scholarly publications devoted to this period, owing to its recency and the ongoing implementation of the projects examined.

6. Conclusion

The analysis conducted makes it possible to conclude that the energy policy of the Republic of Uzbekistan underwent a substantial transformation during the period 2016–2026, acquiring a pronounced geopolitical dimension. The institutional reforms of the energy sector initiated after 2016 created the foundation for the implementation of major infrastructure projects over the following decade. Uzbekistan's transition from the status of a net exporter of natural gas to a stable importer of Russian pipeline gas has become a structural shift that has redefined the configuration

of energy interdependence in the region. The development of nuclear power in partnership with the state corporation Rosatom and the accelerated expansion of renewable energy capacity, including the formation of a cross-border “green” energy corridor involving Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, demonstrate Uzbekistan's aspiration to diversify both the structure of its energy mix and the range of its external partners. Water-energy issues in relations with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan retain the status of a factor of long-term uncertainty in regional energy geopolitics.

Taken together, the directions examined make it possible to characterise Uzbekistan's energy strategy as multi-vector, combining traditional cooperation with Russia, partnership with international financial institutions and the European Union, and active participation in shaping a new architecture of regional energy ties in Central Asia. This strategy reflects the country's aspiration to position itself not merely as a recipient of external energy support, but as a connecting hub and platform for regional energy dialogue.

Further research could be directed toward a quantitative assessment of the impact of Uzbekistan's growing import dependence on Russian gas on the structure of regional energy security; a comparative analysis of the models of nuclear cooperation pursued by Central Asian states with external suppliers of nuclear technology; an examination of the prospects for implementing the Trans-Caspian “green” energy corridor and its influence on Central Asia's positioning in the European energy market; and an analysis of the institutional mechanisms for resolving water-energy contradictions between upstream and downstream states of the region's transboundary rivers under conditions of climate change.

References

1. Zhiznin, S.Z. Energeticheskaya diplomatiya Rossii: ekonomika, politika, praktika [Energy Diplomacy of Russia: Economics, Politics, Practice] (in Russian) [Electronic resource] // Wikipedia. Available at: https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Энергетическая_дипломатия_России:_экономика,_политика,_практика (accessed 23 July 2026).
2. Processy i instituty energeticheskoy diplomatii: strukturno-funktsionalny analiz [Processes and Institutions of Energy Diplomacy: A Structural-Functional Analysis] (in Russian) [Electronic resource] // Mirovaya politika. 2025. Available at: <https://journals.rcsi.science/2409-8671/article/download/358800/332552> (accessed 23 July 2026).
3. Rossiyskaya energeticheskaya diplomatiya i mezhdunarodnaya energeticheskaya bezopasnost (geopolitika i ekonomika) [Russian Energy Diplomacy and International Energy Security (Geopolitics and Economics)] (in Russian) [Electronic resource] // CyberLeninka. Available at: <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/rossiyskaya-energeticheskaya-diplomatiya-i-mezhdunarodnaya-energeticheskaya-bezopasnost-geopolitika-i-ekonomika> (accessed 23 July 2026).
4. Vodno-energeticheskie problemy Tsentralnoy Azii i vozmozhnye puti ikh razresheniya [Water-Energy Problems of Central Asia and Possible Ways to Resolve Them] (in Russian) [Electronic resource] // CyberLeninka. Available at: <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/vodno-energeticheskie-problemy-tsentralnoy-azii-i-vozmozhnye-puti-ih-razresheniya> (accessed 23 July 2026).
5. Vodnoenergeticheskie problemy Tsentralnoy Azii: politika gosudarstv regiona i perspektivy razvitiya situatsii [Water-Energy Problems of Central Asia: Regional States' Policy and Prospects for the Situation's Development] (in Russian) [Electronic resource] // CyberLeninka. Available at: <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/vodnoenergeticheskie-problemy-tsentralnoy-azii-politika-gosudarstv-regiona-i-perspektivy-razvitiya-situatsii> (accessed 23 July 2026).
6. Vodno-energeticheskaya problema Tsentralnoy Azii i politika Rossii [The Water-Energy Problem of Central Asia and Russian Policy] (in Russian) [Electronic resource] // Siberian Federal University. Available at: https://structure.sfu-kras.ru/files/structure/vodno-energeticheskaya_problema_centralnoy_azii_i_politika_rossii.pdf (accessed 23 July 2026).
7. Central Asia Water and Energy Program (CAWEP) [Electronic resource] // World Bank Group. 2026. Available at: <https://www.vsemirnyjbank.org/ru/region/eca/brief/cawep> (accessed 23 July 2026).

8. Energetika Tsentralnoy Azii: problemy i perspektivy [Central Asian Energy: Problems and Prospects] (in Russian) [Electronic resource] // Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). Available at: <https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/energetika-tsentralnoy-azii-problemy-i-perspektivy/> (accessed 23 July 2026).
9. Uzbekistan khochet prevratit energetiku iz ogranicheniya v odno iz svoikh glavnykh preimushchestv — vitse-premyer [Uzbekistan Wants to Turn Energy from a Constraint into One of Its Main Advantages – Deputy Prime Minister] (in Russian) [Electronic resource] // Gazeta.uz. 12 May 2026. Available at: <https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2026/05/12/energy/> (accessed 23 July 2026).
10. Uzbekistan delaet stavku na reformy v razvitii energetiki [Uzbekistan Bets on Reforms in Energy Development] (in Russian) [Electronic resource] // Energetika i promyshlennost Rossii. No. 07 (507). April 2025. Available at: <https://www.eprussia.ru/epr/507/3569979.htm> (accessed 23 July 2026).
11. Uzbekistan s oktyabrya nachnet pokupat rossiyskiy gaz [Uzbekistan to Start Purchasing Russian Gas from October] (in Russian) [Electronic resource] // Current Time TV. 19 June 2023. Available at: <https://www.currenttime.tv/a/uzbekistan-rossiya-gaz/32465602.html> (accessed 23 July 2026).
12. Uzbekistan khochet poluchat bolshe gaza iz Rossii [Uzbekistan Wants to Receive More Gas from Russia] (in Russian) [Electronic resource] // Vedomosti. 22 February 2024. Available at: <https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2024/02/22/1021681-uzbekistan-hochet-poluchat-bolshe-gaza-iz-rossii> (accessed 23 July 2026).
13. V 2024 godu Uzbekistan planiruet utroit import gaza iz Rossii [In 2024 Uzbekistan Plans to Triple Gas Imports from Russia] (in Russian) [Electronic resource] // Spot.uz. 28 March 2024. Available at: <https://www.spot.uz/ru/2024/03/28/import-gas/> (accessed 23 July 2026).
14. Rossiya uvelichivaet postavki gaza v Uzbekistan do 10,0 mlrd kubometrov v 2026 godu [Russia Increases Gas Supplies to Uzbekistan to 10.0 bcm in 2026] (in Russian) [Electronic resource] // InvestFuture. 7 July 2026. Available at: <https://investfuture.ru/articles/rossiya-uvelichivaet-postavki-gaza-v-uzbekistan-do-10-0-mlrd-kubometrov-v-2026-godu-37193070> (accessed 23 July 2026).
15. Uzbekistan i Rosatom razvivayut proekt AES s aktsentom na bezopasnost i ekologiyu [Uzbekistan and Rosatom Develop the NPP Project with a Focus on Safety and the Environment] (in Russian) [Electronic resource] // InvestFuture. 23 December 2025. Available at: <https://investfuture.ru/articles/uzbekistan-i-rosatom-razvivayut-proekt-aes-s-aktsentom-na-bezopasnost-i-ekologiyu-90119D440A35A6E543258D6900293A7D> (accessed 23 July 2026).
16. Proekt maloy AES v Uzbekistane dast zakazy dlya Rossii do \$24,7 mlrd — «Rosatom» [The Small NPP Project in Uzbekistan Will Generate up to USD 24.7 Billion in Orders for Russia – Rosatom] (in Russian) [Electronic resource] // Gazeta.uz. 26 March 2026. Available at: <https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2026/03/26/rosatom/> (accessed 23 July 2026).
17. AES v Dzhizakskoy oblasti Uzbekistana [Nuclear Power Plant in Jizzakh Region of Uzbekistan] (in Russian) [Electronic resource] // Wikipedia. Available at: https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/АЭС_в_Джизакской_области_Узбекистана (accessed 23 July 2026).
18. Uzbekskeya AES [The Uzbek NPP] (in Russian) [Electronic resource] // Atomnaya Energiya 2.0. Available at: <https://www.atomic-energy.ru/TudakulNPP> (accessed 23 July 2026).
19. V Uzbekistane startovalo stroitelstvo AES maloy moshchnosti [Construction of the Small-Capacity NPP Has Started in Uzbekistan] (in Russian) [Electronic resource] // Strana Rosatom. 10 October 2025. Available at: <https://strana-rosatom.ru/2025/10/10/v-uzbekistane-startovalo-stroitelstvo/> (accessed 23 July 2026).
20. Uzbekskeya ASMM [The Uzbek SNPP] (in Russian) [Electronic resource] // ASE Group of Companies. Available at: <https://ase-ec.ru/about/projects/uzbekskeya-asmm/> (accessed 23 July 2026).
21. Rossiyskaya AES v Uzbekistane: vygoda ili risk? [The Russian NPP in Uzbekistan: Benefit or Risk?] (in Russian) [Electronic resource] // Kun.uz. 23 October 2025. Available at:

<https://kun.uz/ru/news/2025/10/23/rossiyskaya-aes-v-uzbekistane-vygoda-ili-risk> (accessed 23 July 2026).

22. Energetika Uzbekistana [Energy of Uzbekistan] (in Russian) [Electronic resource] // Wikipedia. Available at: https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Энергетика_Узбекистана (accessed 23 July 2026).

23. Tsentralnaya Aziya i Azerbaydzhan: kurs na «zelyonuyu» energetiku [Central Asia and Azerbaijan: A Course Toward “Green” Energy] (in Russian) [Electronic resource] // Vb.kg. Available at: https://www.vb.kg/doc/460299_centralnaia_azia_i_azerbaydjan:_kurs_na_zelenyu_energetiky.html (accessed 23 July 2026).

24. Uzbekistan vykhodit v lidery po investitsiyam i proektam v energetike — itogi 2025 goda [Uzbekistan Emerges as a Leader in Energy Investment and Projects – 2025 Results] (in Russian) [Electronic resource] // Trend.Az. January 2026. Available at: <https://ru.trend.az/business/4136968.html> (accessed 23 July 2026).