

THE SILK GEO-ECONOMIC ALGORITHM OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE PRC AND CEE COUNTRIES

SMOTRYTSKA A. MARIA

Master student of the Political Science Department,
Central China Normal University,
Wuhan, the P.R. of China

Master student of the International Relations Department, V.Stefanyk
Precarpathian National University, and Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine

SmotrM_S@mail.ru

Abstract. The paper deals with the basic elements of cooperation of China and Central-Eastern European countries in the framework of “16+1” format. The author of the paper analyses the relations of the PRC and main actors of CEE sub region. The particular attention is paid to the importance of

“Belt and Road initiative”, Maritime Silk Road and the role of CEE countries in the framework of Chinese geo-economics’ projects.

Keywords: China, Europe, CEE, foreign policy, economy, foreign policy of the PRC, “16+1” format, One Belt-One Road, Belt and Road Initiative, geopolitics.

After the collapse of the world socialist system, the CEE region turned out to be outside the priorities of the Chinese foreign and foreign economic policy. This was due to the transition of the countries of the region to market democracy and unambiguous orientation towards accession to the EU. China viewed these countries as the ideological, political and economic periphery of Western European integration and saw no prospect of competing with the EU in the region.

However, since the 2000s, China's interest in the region has increased noticeably. The 21st century was marked by the strengthening of cooperation between the PRC and countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It was noted that both the entire CEE region as a whole and individual countries in the region are of great interest to Chinese investors. The CEE countries, already firmly entrenched in the economic and political systems of European integration, were viewed as a convenient channel for China's trade and investment expansion in the single economic space of the EU, a "firing field" for working out mechanisms for such expansion and a potential tool for creating favorable attitudes towards Chinese initiatives in EU institutions [2]. The global economic crisis, which limited the possibilities for financial assistance to the CEE countries from the EU budget and provoked disagreements between them and the "old" members of the EU contributed to the opening of the Central European "window of opportunity" for China .

China's cooperation with the CEE countries as a single regional group, regardless of their degree of inclusion in European integration, officially started in 2012. Then, on the initiative of China, bilateral ties were supplemented by multilateral ones under the formula "16 + 1", covering 11 CEE member countries from CEE and 5 Western Balkan countries. Cooperation did not extend to the unrecognized by the PRC Kosovo.

The "16 + 1" format was aimed at intensifying Chinese investments in CEE, increasing the competitiveness of Chinese companies in Europe, including through the acquisition of technologies, recognizable brands and distribution channels, primarily through the purchase of existing enterprises [4]. Priority sectors for Chinese expansion were transport and energy infrastructure, alternative and nuclear energy, mineral and raw materials industries and agro-food complex. In external investments in these industries, the CEE countries needed. In this sense, the interests of both sides of the "16 + 1" format coincided.

Thus, in addition to China, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania and Macedonia were officially included in the formula "16 + 1". The summits were held annually: in Warsaw (2012), Bucharest (2013), Belgrade (2014), Suzhou (2015), Riga (2016), Beijing (2017).

In a short time (2010-2014), China managed to form a number of institutional and financial mechanisms for regional cooperation. A permanent coordinating role in the "16 + 1" format was implemented by the Permanent Secretariat under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China [11, p.51]. Coordinating functions for specific areas of cooperation were assigned to the

relevant structures in CEE countries: investment promotion - in Poland, agriculture - in Bulgaria, etc.

An important complement to bilateral financial instruments was the China-CEE Investment Cooperation Fund with a capital of \$ 0.5 billion, created by the Chinese Eximbank, with the assistance of institutional investors from Poland and Hungary. Until the end of 2014, these resources were almost completely invested in CEE countries, and China's Eximbank announced the replenishment of the fund for another \$ 1 billion [7].

Cooperation within the "16 + 1" format contributed to an increase in trade of CEE countries with China in 2011-2015 by almost 30%, and Chinese FDI in the region were doubled (to almost \$ 1.8 billion). Now the volume of trade and FDI with this region is equivalent to 9-10% of China's trade and investment in the European Union. However, even the largest economy in Poland in CEE in 2015 attracted Chinese FDI only at the level of Greece and almost 20 times less than Germany. In addition, the further expansion of China's presence in CEE was limited to the rules and mechanisms of the EU's single trade, agrarian, transport, energy and other policies.

The second decade of the 21st century put the geo-economic emphasis and cooperation within the framework of China's "One Belt-One Road" initiative into the China-East European states relations.

The Chinese initiative is dictated by the understanding of the importance of the CEE countries as an important component of a unified Europe. Thus, asserting itself in the role of one of the centers of a multipolar world order, Beijing began transforming the economic and political space that developed in CEE with the promotion of favorable economic proposals

to the countries of the region, without raising questions of the difference of ideologies and ways of life.

It should be noted that for 2014 in the countries of the European "core" investment strategy of the PRC has already led to obvious success. The British political establishment, led by Queen Elizabeth II at the highest level, accepted Chairman Xi Jinping, and China called the UK its main partner in Europe - all due to extensive investments into the British energy sector. Several large European countries, including Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy, supported the creation of a new bank for international development: the Asian Bank for Infrastructure Investments - despite the objections of the United States. But for Beijing the European "periphery" became no less important [16].

For the first time, a joint project was announced in 2012 in Warsaw, where Premier Wen Jiabao launched an initiative called "12 measures" of China to encourage friendly cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe:

1. The Chinese government has decided to open a special credit line in the amount of 10 billion US dollars;
2. Granting a certain percentage of soft loans that will be used to support bilateral cooperation projects in such areas as infrastructure development, high technology and a green economy;
3. An initiative to form a joint Chinese and Central Eastern European investment fund;
4. Assistance and support to Chinese enterprises aimed at joint cooperation with the countries of CEE opening of joint economic and technological parks in Europe within the next 5 years;

5. Offering 5,000 scholarships for students of Central and Eastern European countries ;

6. Invitation of 1000 students from Europe to study the Chinese language and sending to the countries of CEE 1000 Chinese students to study in the next 5 years[19].

The leaders of Europe highly appreciated the 12 measures proposed by Premier Wen Jiabao and expressed their unanimous agreement. Both sides expressed their readiness to continue work on deepening business cooperation in the areas of trade, investment, finance and other fields, as well as in the cultural exchange and communication between the peoples of Europe and China, improving communication and coordination in solving important international and regional issues, together to cope with existing problems [8].

Starting in 2013, the main content of the programs of each 16 + 1 summit is the development of tools for this regional format. Naturally, the format of China's cooperation with the CEE countries is closely connected with the implementation of the global concept of the "New Silk Road" proposed by the Chairman of the PRC Xi Jinping. The concept consists of two parts: the land "Economic belt of the Silk Road" and the "Maritime Silk Road of the 21st Century" and potentially involves cooperation of at least 60 countries in Europe and Asia.

By 2015, China has become one of the largest investors in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. In November 2015, the Eastern Europe-China (16 + 1) summit was held in the Chinese city of Suzhong, in which the leaders of the PRC and 16 Eastern European member states and the Balkan countries took part. The meeting resulted in the strengthening of China's economic presence

in Eastern Europe. Also at the trade and economic forum in Hangzhou between China and the countries of CEE in 2015 it was agreed that China is ready to provide financial support for the re-industrialization of the countries of CEE, in the case that it will be conducted using Chinese technologies and equipment.

In 2015-2016, taking into account the opportunities and potentials, each country in the 16 + 1 format chose its own direction. For example, *Bulgaria* will supervise agriculture, *Poland* - investment and trade. The task of *Latvia* will be identification of links and projects, cooperation in the field of logistics, *Romania* will deal with energy projects, *Lithuania* is responsible for educational programs, and *Hungary* for the tourism sector [13].

Latvia believes that "it should take maximum advantage of the advantages of the" 16 + 1 ":" Now China has given us (*Latvia*) a "small chance" and we must be able to take advantage of all the opportunities that this initiative can give us. "Riga is determined to become an important point of the New Silk Road and the Maritime Silk Road of the 21st century.

Estonia considers the mechanism of "16 + 1" and instruments created by it as reliable and promising sources of technology and investments in energy and logistics.

The "16 + 1" format brought real projects to *Slovakia*, provided ample opportunities for promoting cooperation between the two countries in all areas and, as both sides acknowledge, is a successful addition to the pragmatic and long-term cooperation between China and the EU [12]. *Slovakia* expects to use this platform to strengthen cooperation with China in the field of high technology and innovation.

Czech Republic, once an active advocate for the independence of Tibet, is now much closer to Beijing's official line. Thus, in 2012, Prague acted as one of the initiators of the permanent 16 + 1 cooperation mechanism, which envisages China's participation in the development of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Bulgaria also seeks to use the mechanism of "16 + 1" interaction between China and the countries of CEE to further improve mutually beneficial relations [14]. Bulgaria is an important component of the "Economic belt of the New Silk Road" and is interested in using the Chinese initiative to expand its infrastructure and realize its agricultural and tourism opportunities.

Romania became a participant in the development of economic cooperation after the establishment of the mechanism "16 +1". The "Belt and Road" initiative helps to give impetus to the energy sector, in the areas of communications, finance, agriculture, and culture. China and Romania are negotiating on projects in the field of nuclear energy, thermal and hydropower, highway construction. As part of the project, China is investing in the construction of a coal-fired power plant in Romania.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the participation of the Chinese company, completed the construction of TPP "Stanari", which was the first major joint project since the establishment of diplomatic relations. With the financing of the project, for the first time, a trust fund was established under the cooperative mechanism between China and the countries of CEE (\$ 10 billion) [15]. This project was implemented first and acquired symbolic significance for the development of the "16 + 1" mechanism.

The "16 + 1" format , in a certain sense, prepared the transition to a more focused and integrated strategy "One belt- One Road" and successfully

"fits" into its main components - the projects "Economic belt of the Silk Road" and "Marine Silk Road of the XXI century", aimed at developing new land and sea transport, logistics and trade and production systems linking China to Europe. In the first project, the countries of CEE play a key role, in the second - an important transit role in the development of "China-Europe" trade and investment ties, and in the long term - in the formation of a broad Eurasian "economic space" and "political stability belt".

The basic design of the first project is the development on a new technological and organizational basis of the traditional direction of trade and transport "Sino-European" ties, complemented by their investment cooperation. This Northern road includes land international transit to Western Europe from China and other countries of the Asia-Pacific region (primarily, South Korea and Japan) through Russia and Kazakhstan along the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Kazakhstan railway with access to the European part of Russia in The Urals:

- □ Chengdu (Sichuan) - Dostyk-Moscow-Brest-Lodz (Poland)
- □ Suzhou (Jiangsu, Shanghai region) - Warsaw (Poland)
- □ Chongqing (Sichuan region) - Duisburg (Germany)
- □ Zhengzhou (Henan, North China) - Hamburg (Germany)
- □ Wuhan (Hubei, Yangtze belt region) - Pardubice (Czech Republic)
- □ Wuhan - Zabaikalsk - Hamburg
- □ Shenyang (Liaoning, Northeast China) - Hamburg
- Yiwu (Zhejiang, Shanghai region) - Madrid (Spain)

Nevertheless, the transit and logistical potential of the other CEE countries is still used slightly. Almost not involved in the "European part" of

the Northern road are the ports of Poland and the Baltic countries that gravitate towards it. On the contrary, the main transport and logistics centers for Chinese goods (primarily German Duisburg and Hamburg) are already overloaded, and the possibilities for expanding their capacities are limited.

Such uneven distribution of cargo flows combined with insufficient technological level of the transport and logistics infrastructure of the CEE countries hinders the further development of China-Europe ties. There are also serious organizational and economic limitations of this development. Most of the provinces (especially the western ones, remote from the sea) tend to establish regular communication with Europe for both economic and prestigious reasons. The export potential of only the western provinces of China is estimated at \$ 40 billion. Therefore, the full utilization of trains and partial financing of transportation costs are provided by local authorities on the basis of public-private partnerships (especially since many Chinese companies retain great state involvement).

The northern road is potentially the most promising for both the development of a multimodal communication between China and Europe, and for the creation on its basis of economic, industrial, information and other "belts". New opportunities for such development were created by "The Suzhou Provisions on Cooperation between the PRC and CEE Countries" adopted at the "16 + 1" meeting in Suzhou in November 2015 and the "Medium-Term Plan for Cooperation between the PRC and CEE Countries". These documents significantly expand the range of sectors (including all types of infrastructure, including aviation and port, transport, agribusiness, information, scientific, educational and cultural cooperation), increase the complexity and terms of "planned" cooperation (up to 5 years). They

consolidate a combination of strategies and forms of cooperation with the CEE countries that are advantageous for China on a two- and multi-sided (within the framework of the "16 + 1" mechanism).

In the framework of this new approach, in 2016 a system of "reference points" of "BRI" in the CEE subregion, gravitating towards the Northern Road.

Poland takes the central place in the initiative, being the main China's transit partner and trading partner in CEE. In addition, in 2016, it officially became the first country in CEE - a participant and founder of China-initiated Asian Bank for Infrastructure Investment (ABII). In June 2016, during the visit of President Xi Jinping, China signed a bilateral declaration on strategic partnership and about 40 interdepartmental and other agreements and treaties, including cooperation in the development of infrastructure, energy (including nuclear), industry, the digital economy, science and education. At the key points on the Polish section of the railway and motorways to Western Europe (Lodz, Warsaw, and Poznan), the transport and storage infrastructure is being modernized, and a project has been prepared for the creation of a Polish-Chinese transport center and an industrial park near the Polish-Belarusian border. The possibility of China's participation in the modernization and expansion of the port in Gdansk is being studied with the aim of transferring part of the China-Europe freight flow from it to a more expensive port in German Hamburg.

Along with Poland, the *Czech Republic*, which already has direct regular rail service, may become the "reference points" in the cooperation of this group of CEE countries with China [10] (with it a strategic partnership declaration and a number of investment agreements were signed in 2016),

Latvia (in 2016 the Coordinating Secretariat in the field of logistics was established there and the direct rail communication with China was opened , and the Port of Riga is seen as a potential transport and logistics hub for the delivery of Chinese goods to the Scandinavian countries) [25], *Lithuania* was less involved (the port in Klaipeda is also considered as a possible point of transshipment of Chinese cargo to Europe).

A special place is occupied by *Hungary*, which has no direct transport connection with China, but is China's first and still most active partner in CEE. It accounts for more than 30% of Chinese FDI in the region [9]. She is an observer in ABII and for the time being she is the only CEE country formally joining the "Belt and Road initiative". Hungary also gravitates to the Central Road within the framework of the "BRI" and to the South European road within the framework of the Maritime Silk Road.

The central road (or the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route) leads from Western China through Kazakhstan and the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, from there to Georgia and further through the Black Sea to the ports of *Bulgaria* and *Romania*. It also includes the ports of Turkey (with further transit to the countries of Southern Europe and the Balkan countries of Central and Eastern Europe) and *Ukraine* (with potential transit to Slovakia, Hungary and through Belarus to Lithuania). Serious barriers on it are the crossing of 4 customs borders, the need for 4 trans-shipments from land to sea transport, the lack of an agreed "through tariff". Until today thought this road less than 10 trains were tested (mainly from China), with a much smaller number of wagons and loading than the Northern road.

An important problem is the almost complete loading of the Black Sea ports of Georgia for sea transit in CEE. In addition, their total container

capacity (about 500 thousand containers) is already small for the current transit. The insufficient number and carrying capacity of ferries is small as well. The corresponding ports of *Bulgaria* [1], *Romania* and *Ukraine* as well as the port and border rail networks of these countries need modernization. China has already declared the possibility of participating in such modernization. Therefore, in the long term, the Central road will be able to compete with the North road, but it is unlikely that it will "intercept" the bulk of cargo transportation "China-Europe" [6]. The only "anchor point" of the "BRI" on this route may be *Hungary*, as a potential intermediate link connecting the Central and Northern road.

Hungary has even greater potential as a "reference point" on the European segment of the "Maritime Silk Road of the XXI century"(MSR). The second anchor point here is Serbia - the largest western Balkan country that has not yet joined the European Union [22]. The Western Balkans are becoming an important link connecting the Mediterranean section of the MSR with the CEE region and further - with Western Europe.

The main "maritime hub" of the south-European route of the MSR is already practically controlled by China - *the Greek port of Piraeus* [17]. Chinese companies began a large-scale reconstruction of Piraeus, due to which by 2020 it should be equal in power to the current main port of Chinese goods unloading - Dutch Rotterdam.

Piraeus will be connected by high-speed rail and highway highways through *Macedonia* with the main "land hub" of the southern European road - *Serbia* [5]. From Serbia, by land transit through Hungary, as well as by river along the Danube and associated European water transport networks, Chinese cargo will go to other countries of Central and Eastern Europe and to

Western Europe. The transformation of Serbia into a regional land hub will be facilitated by the modernization of the Adriatic port of Bar in *Montenegro* and the railway connecting it with Serbian Belgrade, as well as the construction of the Belgrade-Bar high-speed highway.

The importance of *Serbia* in China's plans has increased significantly in recent years, both economically and politically. Economically, Serbia is the fifth largest recipient of China's FDI in CEE after Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Romania [3], as well as the coordinator for cooperation in railway transport and infrastructure within the framework of the "16 + 1". Politically, it firmly supports China's position on Taiwan and the struggle against internal separatism in exchange for supporting Serbia on the issue of non-recognition of the statehood of Kosovo [23].

Practical implementation of the "western Balkan" expansion of China as a whole is proceeding according to plan. The Sino-Hungarian-Serbian transport agreement with the predominant Chinese financial and industrial-technological participation built a bridge across the Danube in Belgrade (\$ 360 million) [21], and construct the road and rail highways in Hungary, Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Greece. Chinese companies are already being introduced into the extractive and processing industries, energy and agro-food complex of the Western Balkans.

All this will allow China, in the medium term, to take control of Central European transit both along the Northern and Central "BRI" routes, and along the West-Balkan MSR. This will contribute to strengthening China's influence on the strategy of social and economic development of the CEE countries, especially the countries of the Western Balkans, less developed economically and weakerly associated with the European Union [24].

Humanitarian influence is also increasing - the leadership of the PRC encourages interpersonal contacts with the CEE countries, especially through tourism, student and youth exchanges, etc [20]. China's credibility in the region is also growing, because now almost any project of cooperation on a bi-versatile basis is served under the brand "One Belt-One Road", which allows China to demonstrate real (albeit small) successes literally every year [18]. This is especially noticeable against the backdrop of crisis phenomena in the European Union and the weakening of the ties between the CEE region and Russia.

Thus, it can be noted that the participating countries of "16 + 1" mechanism understood the scale, prospects and synergies of this interaction. It should be emphasized that the "Old" EU countries are wary of Chinese activity in the Central European zone of their influence and insist that all members (and candidate members) coordinate their cooperation with China, and that the EU should speak with the PRC "with one voice". Nevertheless the strategic concepts of the development of these states reflect the importance and priority of both bilateral relations with China and cooperation in the China-EU format. That is why most of the foreign policy strategies of the CEE states are oriented toward expanding foreign economic activity and trade with the PRC. It is necessary to emphasize the consistency and planning of work in this direction, conducted by the states of the "16 + 1" format. As we can see, pragmatic economic diplomacy started to prevail in the newest foreign policy history of Europe.

REFERENCES

1. Константно унапређујемо наше пословање, улажемо у нове технологије и бринемо о животној и радној средини. [Electronic resource]. - URL: http://www.nis.rs/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=135&Itemid=246&language=ru (Reference date: 3, Mar.,2017).

2. Agata Loskot-Strachota, Similar or completely different? Policy of increasing security of gas supply in the Central and Eastern European countries, Bulletin of Central and Eastern Europe Pulse of the Region,no.4. CEED Institute. [Electronic resource]. - URL: <http://ceedinstitute.org/attachments/286/14f6123435c40c25b4f54c57c20b97aa.pdf> (Reference date: 4, Apr., 2016).

3. Bulgaria, Russia Sign 8 Memoranda during Putin's Visit. [Electronic resource]. - URL: <http://solicitorbulgaria.com/index.php/bulgaria-russia-sign-8-memoranda-during-putinsvisit> (Reference date: 6, March, 2008).

4. "Bulgaria Abandons Burgas-Alexandroupolis Oil Pipeline". [Electronic resource]. - URL: <http://www.novinite.com/articles/134623/Bulgaria%20Abandons%20BurgasAlexandroupolis%20Oil%20Pipeline> (Reference date: 7, Dec.,2011).

5. "CEZ cancels Temelin 3&4 project". Nuclear Engineering International. [Electronic resource]. - URL: <http://www.neimagazine.com/news/newscez-cancels-temelin-34-project-4213193> (Reference date: 11, April, 2014).

6. Elizabeth Konstantinova, Gazprom Starts South Stream Pipeline Construction in Bulgaria. [Electronic resource]. - URL: [http://www.ajr.us/ajr-5-5-2017/13193-Elizabeth-Konstantinova-Gazprom-Starts-South-Stream-Pipeline-Construction-in-Bulgaria](#) (Reference date: 11, April, 2014).

<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-31/gazprom-starts-south-stream-pipelineconstruction-in-bulgaria.html> (Reference date: 31, Oct.,2013).

7. European Commission, EUROPEAN ECONOMY, Member States'Energy Dependence: An Indicator-Based Assessment, Occasional Papers 145.[Electronic resource]. - URL: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2013/pdf/ocp145_en.pdf (Reference date: April 2013).

8. Gazprom: Work on South Stream Pipeline in Bulgaria Continues As Planned. [Electronic resource]. - URL: http://www.publics.bg/en/news/11242/Gazprom_Work_on_South_Stream_Pipeline_in_Bulgaria_Continues_As_Planned.html (Reference date: 13, June, 2014).

9. Hungary lawmakers OK Russia nuclear plant deal. [Electronic resource]. - URL: <http://news.yahoo.com/hungary-lawmakers-ok-russia-nuclear-plant-deal-133146384--finance.html> (Reference date: 6, Feb.,2014).

10. Krško Nuclear Power Plant, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kr%C5%A1ko_Nuclear_Power_Plant 资料来源: World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013. [Electronic resource]. - URL: <http://www.worldnuclearreport.org/IMG/pdf/20130716mscworldnuclearreport2013-hr-v4.pdf> (Reference date: 01, Oct.,2015).

11. Long Jing. Relations between China and CEE Countries: Development, Challenges and Recommendations // China International Studies. No.48, September/October 2014. P. 51

12. Nuclear Power Programme of the Slovak Republic, Vienna. [Electronic resource]. - URL:

<http://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloadable/Meetings/2013/2013-03-18-03-21-TMNPE/17.zemenova.pdf> (Reference date: 18, Mar.,2012).

13. Russian Energy Minister Implies Burgas. Alexandroupoli Oil Pipeline Revival. [Electronic resource]. - URL: http://www.publics.bg/en/news/10897/Russian_Energy_Minister_Implies_BurgasAlexandroupoli_Oil_Pipeline_Revival_.html (Reference date: 20.02.2014)

14. "Trans-Balkan Oil Pipeline Hit By Delays". Downstream Today. Bulgaria bins trans-Balkan pipe plan, Upstream Online (NHST Media Group). [Electronic resource]. - URL: <http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/article1190711.ece> (Reference date: 11, June, 2010).

15. Vladimir Zhelyazkov, Putin begins visit to Bulgaria. [Electronic resource]. - URL: http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2003/03/01/Putin-begins-visit-toBulgaria/UPI-46121046546962/ (Reference date: 1, March, 2003).

16. 2002 年 , Беопетрол. [Electronic resource]. - URL: <http://www.oilru.com/news/17002/> (Reference date: 26, Aug.,2003).

17. 布尔加斯-亚历山德鲁波利输油管线项目在 1993- 1994 年间由俄罗斯和希腊的一些企业提出。1994 年, 保加利亚同希腊签署了建设希腊至保加利亚境内管线的协定。2005 年 1 月, 保加利亚、希腊和俄罗斯签署了准备建设该输油管线的联合议定书。同年 4 月 12 日, 三国签署了政治备忘录。

18. 但俄罗斯能源部长在 2014 年 2 月暗示, 俄罗斯与保加利亚有可能就布尔加斯- 亚历山德鲁波利输油管线建设问题重启谈判。

19. 溪天然气管线沿线的中东欧国家包括：保加利亚、塞尔维亚、匈牙利、斯洛文尼亚和克罗地亚。

20. 欧盟第三能源一揽子方案是一个法律一揽子方案，旨在进一步放开欧盟内部的天然气和电力市场。该一揽子方案 2007 年 9 月由欧盟委员会提出，2009 年 7 月由欧洲议会和欧盟理事会通过。同年 9 月 3 日开始实施。第三能源一揽子方案的核心内容是：私有制分离，即能源生产和销售的公司必须与运输网络分开（第 9 条），欧盟每个成员国都必须建立国家管理当局和能源管理者合作局，后者是成员国国家管理当局共同工作的论坛（Regulation (EC) No 713/2009）。

21. 俄方拥有该公司 51% 的股份。2011 年 11 月 21 日，“巴纳特院子”开始运营，它是东南欧最大的地下天然气存储地，实际规模为 4.5 亿立方米，最大生产能力为一昼夜 500 万立方米，而且有进一步扩大的潜力。该储气罐使俄罗斯可以同时塞尔维亚、匈牙利和波黑出口天然气。该储气项目实际上也是南溪的第一个项目。

22. 欧盟委员会第三能源一揽子法规（the EU Third Energy Package）规定，欧盟境内的贡献不能属于天然气采掘公司。

23. 俄罗斯的石油通过“友谊”石油管线运到尼什的炼油厂。西方把俄罗斯-塞尔维亚之间石油天然气协定称之为“政治交易”，怀疑塞尔维亚政府没有进行招标便将战略资产卖给了俄罗斯天然气工业公司，以换取俄罗斯在科索沃问题上的支持

24. 2002 年，匈牙利石油公司（Mol）同尤科斯石油公司签署了类似的长期协定，在 9 年间每年向匈牙利提供 540 万吨原油。

25. 目前，斯洛伐克也在探索利用国内铀矿生产铀的可能性。斯洛伐克估计有铀 U_{3O8} 储量 12900 吨。



Smotrytska Mariia Alexandrovna - received the Bachelor degree in Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National University (Ukraine), studied in Asian-Pacific International relations major in Maria Curie-Sklodowska University (Poland; EU Non-degree program) 2012-2016. Now she is pursuing her Masters degrees in Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National University (Ukraine) and Central China Normal University (P.R.of China).